Turnaround and Distressed Investing  ·  Chapter 18 of 32
Chapter 18

Dropdowns and Asset Transfers

The J.Crew trapdoor, unrestricted subsidiaries, and collateral leakage

2016
the J.Crew transaction
Investment baskets
the mechanism
J.Screwed
what the market called it

The dropdown moves collateral beyond the reach of the lenders who financed it, using capacity that already existed in the credit agreement. J.Crew executed the transaction that gave the technique its name, and the market has spent the years since trying to close a door that was never locked.

How a dropdown works

The steps are simple and each is individually permitted. First, the borrower designates a subsidiary as unrestricted — outside the credit group, not bound by the covenants, its assets not part of the collateral package. Second, it transfers assets to that subsidiary, structured as an investment and drawing on investment basket capacity. Third, the unrestricted subsidiary, now holding valuable assets and free of the parent's covenants, borrows against them from new lenders.

The original lenders' collateral package has been reduced by the value transferred, and the new lenders hold a first claim on assets that previously secured the existing loans. Nothing in the agreement was breached. The capacity was there.

The J.Crew transaction

In 2016, J.Crew transferred a majority interest in its intellectual property — the brand itself, its most valuable asset — to an unrestricted subsidiary, using a chain of investment baskets that permitted transfers to restricted subsidiaries and onward to unrestricted ones. The IP was then used to support new financing and a debt exchange that benefited participating holders.

The transaction was challenged and largely settled, but the technique was established. The chain of permissions it exploited became known as the trapdoor, and 'J-Screwed' entered the vocabulary of the market. Subsequent agreements added J.Crew blockers — provisions specifically prohibiting the transfer of material IP to unrestricted subsidiaries — which sponsors' counsel then worked around by identifying other valuable assets and other basket chains.

Finding the capacity before it is used

The analysis is mechanical and it is the highest-value document work in the field. Locate the definition of Unrestricted Subsidiary and the designation mechanics — what conditions must be satisfied, whose consent is required, whether there is a pro forma leverage test. Locate every investment basket and total the capacity, including builder baskets that grow with retained earnings, ratio baskets that expand with EBITDA, and general baskets denominated as the greater of a dollar amount and a percentage.

Then ask what the company's most valuable transferable assets are — intellectual property, a brand, a subsidiary with contracted cash flows, real estate — and whether the available capacity is sufficient to move them. If it is, you have identified the transaction before it happens. This is the analysis distressed funds run across their entire watchlist.

Defences and their limits

Modern agreements attempt to close these paths: J.Crew blockers on material IP, caps on transfers to unrestricted subsidiaries, requirements that any such transfer be at fair market value, conditions requiring pro forma covenant compliance, and provisions treating the designation of an unrestricted subsidiary as an investment charged against a specific basket.

The defences are imperfect because the underlying tension is unresolvable by drafting alone. Borrowers require genuine operational flexibility — joint ventures, acquisitions, regulated entities — and every grant of flexibility is capacity that can be repurposed. The market's more durable response has been organisational rather than textual: cooperation agreements among lenders, and greater attention at origination to who else is in the syndicate.